I have picked up Visteon today at 57. I think this is no brainer. If you want to read the detailed analysis, please read it here. The entire credit goes to Ryan from Cushman Capital. Excellent Analysis.
Brief Business Description:
Visteon Corporation is a global Tier 1 supplier of automotive products to original equipment manufacturers (OEM’s). Visteon is a market leader in each of its three core product groups: climate, electronics, and interior systems. Visteon is geographically diversified and is not overly reliant on any one particular OEM. The company’s three largest customers are Ford, Hyundai/Kia, and Nissan/Renault (which make up 29%, 27%, and 9% of the company’s revenues respectively).
Opportunity Overview:
Visteon’s shares are currently trading on a “when issued” basis at roughly 3x 2011 EBITDA, and after backing out the company’s significant ownership in high growth subsidiaries, we believe the core Visteon business trades for roughly 1.5x EBITDA. Given Visteon’s multiple internal and external catalyst’s, highly attractive absolute valuation and the outsized spread between the company’s “when issued” shares and the already depressed valuation’s of its global competitors, we think that the stars are aligning for bargain hunting investors to generate spectacular returns of 30%+ in a short period of time with relatively low risk. Keep in mind that this isn’t “your father’s” Visteon, as the company will exit bankruptcy permanently improved and completely transformed, offering investor’s both a 1) quick, high-return, relatively risk-free arbitrage and/or 2) an inexpensive way to play any upturn in - or at least the stabilization of – global auto sales and economic activity in general.
The idea here is simple. As Visteon exits chapter 11, the near to medium-term upside will likely be driven by a combination of 1) a couple of imminent, high probability catalyst’s that should force the market to assign this company with a much more appropriate valuation on an absolute basis and relative to its peers and 2) various operational and financial enhancements that the company recently undertook while in bankruptcy should continue to yield visible and increasingly positive operating results for the foreseeable future.
Our expectation is that the initial roughly 30%+ will come almost instantaneously (within a month or so) as 1) the stock begins to trade regular way 2) equity analysts initiate coverage and 3) various institutional and index funds that have been unable to purchase the stock up until this point (due to restrictions on purchasing company’s in Ch. 11), begin buying in droves. Notably, the return assumption above assumes that upon re-emergence the company trade’s at an incredibly non-demanding multiple of 3.75x EBITDA or, to put it another way, in line with the cheapest automotive suppliers within the industry as a whole. Keep in mind that we think this estimate is very (almost unjustifiably) conservative given that on average Visteon’s peers tend to be considerably more levered, and typically possess both lower EBITDA margins as well as less attractive long-term growth prospects.
http://www.sumzero.com/postings/3190/guest_view
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
Monday, October 4, 2010
Arbitrage Spreads
Reuters has excellent website which provides you arbitrage spreads. Based on Seth Klarmans interview, there are a lot more values in spin off's, post BK and merger arbitrage. My quest for learning has only increased. I will continue to post any possible links to these items.
http://www.reuters.com/finance/deals/arbitrageSpreads
http://www.reuters.com/finance/deals/arbitrageSpreads
Excellent write up on Visteon by Average odds investing
Hat tip to mwhitman for doing all the heavy lifting
Thesis:
The Visteon Corporation is a classic post reorg/special situation with a large margin of safety and substantial near-term upside potential.
Brief Business Description:
Visteon Corporation is a global Tier 1 supplier of automotive products to original equipment manufacturers (OEM’s). Visteon is a market leader in each of its three core product groups: climate, electronics, and interior systems. Visteon is geographically diversified and is not overly reliant on any one particular OEM. The company’s three largest customers are Ford, Hyundai/Kia, and Nissan/Renault (which make up 29%, 27%, and 9% of the company’s revenues respectively).
Opportunity Overview:
Visteon’s shares are currently trading on a “when issued” basis at roughly 3x 2011 EBITDA, and after backing out the company’s significant ownership in high growth subsidiaries, we believe the core Visteon business trades for between 1.5x and 1.7x EBITDA. Given Visteon’s multiple internal and external catalyst’s, highly attractive absolute valuation and the outsized spread between the company’s “when issued” shares and the already depressed valuation’s of its global competitors, we think that the stars are aligning for bargain hunting investors to generate spectacular returns of 30%+ in a short period of time with relatively low risk. Keep in mind that this isn’t “your father’s” Visteon, as the company will exit bankruptcy permanently improved and completely transformed, offering investor’s both a 1) quick, high-return, relatively risk-free arbitrage and/or 2) an inexpensive way to play any upturn in – or at least the stabilization of – global auto sales and economic activity in general.
The idea here is simple. As Visteon exits chapter 11, the near to medium-term upside will likely be driven by a combination of 1) a couple of imminent, high probability catalyst’s that should force the market to assign this company with a much more appropriate valuation on an absolute basis and relative to its peers and 2) various operational and financial enhancements that the company recently undertook while in bankruptcy should continue to yield visible and increasingly positive operating results for the foreseeable future.
Our expectation is that the initial roughly 30%+ will come almost instantaneously (within a month or so) as 1) the stock begins to trade regular way 2) equity analysts initiate coverage and 3) various institutional and index funds that have been unable to purchase the stock up until this point (due to restrictions on purchasing company’s in Ch. 11), begin buying in droves. Notably, the return assumption above assumes that upon re-emergence the company trade’s at an incredibly non-demanding multiple of 3.75x EBITDA or, to put it another way, in line with the cheapest automotive suppliers within the industry as a whole. Keep in mind that we think this estimate is very (almost unjustifiably) conservative given that on average Visteon’s peers tend to be considerably more levered, and typically possess both lower EBITDA margins as well as less attractive long-term growth prospects.
http://aboveaverageodds.wordpress.com/2010/09/24/investment-analysis-the-visteon-corporation-vstnq/
Thesis:
The Visteon Corporation is a classic post reorg/special situation with a large margin of safety and substantial near-term upside potential.
Brief Business Description:
Visteon Corporation is a global Tier 1 supplier of automotive products to original equipment manufacturers (OEM’s). Visteon is a market leader in each of its three core product groups: climate, electronics, and interior systems. Visteon is geographically diversified and is not overly reliant on any one particular OEM. The company’s three largest customers are Ford, Hyundai/Kia, and Nissan/Renault (which make up 29%, 27%, and 9% of the company’s revenues respectively).
Opportunity Overview:
Visteon’s shares are currently trading on a “when issued” basis at roughly 3x 2011 EBITDA, and after backing out the company’s significant ownership in high growth subsidiaries, we believe the core Visteon business trades for between 1.5x and 1.7x EBITDA. Given Visteon’s multiple internal and external catalyst’s, highly attractive absolute valuation and the outsized spread between the company’s “when issued” shares and the already depressed valuation’s of its global competitors, we think that the stars are aligning for bargain hunting investors to generate spectacular returns of 30%+ in a short period of time with relatively low risk. Keep in mind that this isn’t “your father’s” Visteon, as the company will exit bankruptcy permanently improved and completely transformed, offering investor’s both a 1) quick, high-return, relatively risk-free arbitrage and/or 2) an inexpensive way to play any upturn in – or at least the stabilization of – global auto sales and economic activity in general.
The idea here is simple. As Visteon exits chapter 11, the near to medium-term upside will likely be driven by a combination of 1) a couple of imminent, high probability catalyst’s that should force the market to assign this company with a much more appropriate valuation on an absolute basis and relative to its peers and 2) various operational and financial enhancements that the company recently undertook while in bankruptcy should continue to yield visible and increasingly positive operating results for the foreseeable future.
Our expectation is that the initial roughly 30%+ will come almost instantaneously (within a month or so) as 1) the stock begins to trade regular way 2) equity analysts initiate coverage and 3) various institutional and index funds that have been unable to purchase the stock up until this point (due to restrictions on purchasing company’s in Ch. 11), begin buying in droves. Notably, the return assumption above assumes that upon re-emergence the company trade’s at an incredibly non-demanding multiple of 3.75x EBITDA or, to put it another way, in line with the cheapest automotive suppliers within the industry as a whole. Keep in mind that we think this estimate is very (almost unjustifiably) conservative given that on average Visteon’s peers tend to be considerably more levered, and typically possess both lower EBITDA margins as well as less attractive long-term growth prospects.
http://aboveaverageodds.wordpress.com/2010/09/24/investment-analysis-the-visteon-corporation-vstnq/
Sunday, October 3, 2010
Insights from Mohnish Pabrai's annual meeting
Pabrai Funds Annual Meeting
Chicago Illinois
September 25th 2010
Prepared Comments:
The meeting started with an overview of how the fund has performed. Since the fund was started in 2001, it has returned 15.1% annually compared to -1.5% for the S&P 500.
$100,000 invested in the fund in June of 2000 would be $408,000 today.
Mohnish’s goal is to beat the index by 3% annually.
This past summer 3 interns worked part time on the checklist 2.0. They identified mistakes by great investors that resulted in a permanent loss of capital and analyzed why the mistakes occurred. They looked for commentary by the fund managers on these mistakes. They found that these investors almost never discussed their mistakes.
The biggest mistake was an investment in AIG by the Davis Fund which resulted in a $2 billion loss for the fund.
Mohnish said that the checklist is a great weapon in the Pabrai Funds arsenal.
Mohnish then went through one winner and one loser in the portfolio.
The worst investment during the period was Ternium which was actually sold at a small gain.
The winner he discussed was Teck cominco. This is the best investment the fund has ever made. The Pabrai Funds made an 8x return in only 3 months. Mohnish invested because they have some of the lowest cost mines in the world. The reason they were so cheap was because of a liquidity mismatch on the balance sheet. It had a large amount of debt coming due in a year. Mohnish felt that if they weren’t able to refinance the debt that they could sell assets piecemeal because of their highly diversified operations. In the worse case, the company would be worth a lot even in reorganizations because its book value was so high.
Question and Answer:
How Long did you follow Teck Cominco before buying?
Mohnish said he spent less than 5 days researching Teck because there were so many bargains at this time. Teck had a very solid moat because it was the lowest cost producer. To find Teck he looked at industry cost curves and paid attention to the lowest cost producers. The most important question to figure out was the liquidity mismatch.
Thoughts on Fairfax?
He doesn’t discuss current holdings.
Why don’t you discuss current holdings?
If investors get in the habit of discussing their investments they may end up suffering from commitment bias. If they constantly talk about how great a company is, they may suffer from a bias that could impair their judgment.
What are your views on position sizing?
His allocation policy changed in 2008 to reflect slightly elevated investment risks of his investment baskets and prior mistakes. If he has 10% positions it’s very hard to recover from a mistake. He discussed his new allocation framework with Charlie Munger who disagreed at first. After Mohnish explained it further, Charlie agreed that Berkshire Hathaway has achieved success with a more diversified portfolio. Mohnish talked about basket bets. When the risk is slightly elevated he will buy a basket of companies with small weightings. For example, he said he is currently researching companies in Japan. If he ends up buying companies there, he will buy a basket of companies each with small weightings in the portfolio. He said stocks there are very cheap.
Please read the rest here. Thanks Guru Focus
http://www.gurufocus.com/news.php?id=108213
Chicago Illinois
September 25th 2010
Prepared Comments:
The meeting started with an overview of how the fund has performed. Since the fund was started in 2001, it has returned 15.1% annually compared to -1.5% for the S&P 500.
$100,000 invested in the fund in June of 2000 would be $408,000 today.
Mohnish’s goal is to beat the index by 3% annually.
This past summer 3 interns worked part time on the checklist 2.0. They identified mistakes by great investors that resulted in a permanent loss of capital and analyzed why the mistakes occurred. They looked for commentary by the fund managers on these mistakes. They found that these investors almost never discussed their mistakes.
The biggest mistake was an investment in AIG by the Davis Fund which resulted in a $2 billion loss for the fund.
Mohnish said that the checklist is a great weapon in the Pabrai Funds arsenal.
Mohnish then went through one winner and one loser in the portfolio.
The worst investment during the period was Ternium which was actually sold at a small gain.
The winner he discussed was Teck cominco. This is the best investment the fund has ever made. The Pabrai Funds made an 8x return in only 3 months. Mohnish invested because they have some of the lowest cost mines in the world. The reason they were so cheap was because of a liquidity mismatch on the balance sheet. It had a large amount of debt coming due in a year. Mohnish felt that if they weren’t able to refinance the debt that they could sell assets piecemeal because of their highly diversified operations. In the worse case, the company would be worth a lot even in reorganizations because its book value was so high.
Question and Answer:
How Long did you follow Teck Cominco before buying?
Mohnish said he spent less than 5 days researching Teck because there were so many bargains at this time. Teck had a very solid moat because it was the lowest cost producer. To find Teck he looked at industry cost curves and paid attention to the lowest cost producers. The most important question to figure out was the liquidity mismatch.
Thoughts on Fairfax?
He doesn’t discuss current holdings.
Why don’t you discuss current holdings?
If investors get in the habit of discussing their investments they may end up suffering from commitment bias. If they constantly talk about how great a company is, they may suffer from a bias that could impair their judgment.
What are your views on position sizing?
His allocation policy changed in 2008 to reflect slightly elevated investment risks of his investment baskets and prior mistakes. If he has 10% positions it’s very hard to recover from a mistake. He discussed his new allocation framework with Charlie Munger who disagreed at first. After Mohnish explained it further, Charlie agreed that Berkshire Hathaway has achieved success with a more diversified portfolio. Mohnish talked about basket bets. When the risk is slightly elevated he will buy a basket of companies with small weightings. For example, he said he is currently researching companies in Japan. If he ends up buying companies there, he will buy a basket of companies each with small weightings in the portfolio. He said stocks there are very cheap.
Please read the rest here. Thanks Guru Focus
http://www.gurufocus.com/news.php?id=108213
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